上海财经大学投资系
2019年系列学术报告第7期
【主题】：Proportional vs. Unit Fees: Incentive and Welfare
【主讲】：姚志勇，复旦大学管理学院产业经济学系副教授
【时间】：2019年10月29日（周二）15:00-16:30
【地点】：上海市杨浦区武川路111号上海财经大学凤凰楼202室
【主办】：上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院投资系、上海财经大学不动产研究所
【主持】：冯旭南  上海财经大学投资系主任
【摘要】：
We compare the private and social incentives in choosing between proportional and unit fees, which are widely used in platform markets, retailing, taxation, and technology licensing. On a monopoly network platform, a fee scheme raises welfare if and only if it also raises the total business profits. The network is always better off under proportional fees, but the impacts on welfare and merchants are both ambiguous. In particular, welfare may decrease if the demand is super-convex even though it always increases for sub-convex demands. Furthermore, welfare is more likely to drop if the network's marginal cost is lower, the merchant's marginal costs are higher, or merchant competition is weaker. When multiple networks compete, proportional fees always improve welfare, but the total profits decrease unless competition is extremely limited. It is therefore impossible for networks and merchants to both gain under proportional fees, and they may both lose.
【主讲人介绍】：
姚志勇，复旦大学管理学院产业经济学系副教授, 复旦大学住房政策研究中心执行主任。他于北京大学获得经济学学士和硕士学位，于美国加州大学洛杉矶分校获得经济学博士学位。姚志勇曾任教于北京大学、上海交通大学，目前主要从事投资经济学、产业经济学、金融经济学、中国经济改革等领域的教学和科研工作，在Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 《金融研究》等国内外学术期刊上发表SSCI和CSSCI论文十多篇，并主持两项国家自科基金项目与多项省部级科研项目。